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NOTES
THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION TO DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION: A RE-EVALUATION
The First Judiciary Act of 1789,' creating the federal court system, vested
in the lower federal courts power to hear controversies between citizens of dif-
ferent states. 2
 Today, original jurisdiction over diversity cases lies with the
federal district courts pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code.' On its
face, 28 U.S.C. section 1332 appears to grant district courts unrestricted power
to hear cases between litigants of diverse citizenship, subject only to the condi-
tion that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000. 4 Despite the apparent
breadth of the jurisdiction granted, there are cases in which the federal courts
will not act, though the statutory requirements of diversity of citizenship and
$10,000 in controversy have been satisfied. 5 One judicially created exception to
such diversity jurisdiction is the domestic relations exception. 6 Generally
stated, this exception excludes from federal court diversity jurisdiction the
power to hear domestic matters, including the power to grant divorces, or to
determine alimony, support or child custody rights.' The domestic relations
exception originated in the dicta of two Supreme Court cases. 8
 In applying the
exception, many federal courts have interpreted the phrase "domestic rela-
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Sec. 11, 1 Stat. 78.
2
 And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at com-
mon law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen of the
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.
Id. Congress enacted this statute pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, which provides in
part: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.... (t)he
judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States...."
U.S. CONST. art. III, $$ 1,2. The power to hear controversies between citizens of different states
is commonly referred to as diversity jurisdiction. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 5 23,
at 85 (3d ed. 1976).
' 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Original jurisdiction over diversity cases
was originally vested in the circuit courts, pursuant to the First judiciary Act. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 2, $ 1, at 4. For the relevant language of the statute, see supra note 2. Diversity jurisdiction
was established in the district courts with the enactment of the Judicial Code of 1911, which
abolished the circuit courts and transferred their jurisdiction to the district courts. See id. at 6.
4
 "The district courts shall have original jurisidiction of all civil action where the mat-
ter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is be-
tween —
(1) citizens of different States.... " Id.
5 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25, at 96-99.
6 Id. at 97. Another judicially created exception is the probate exception. For a general
discussion of the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3610 (1975).
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982).
8 Id. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582, 584 (1858).
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tions" expansively. 9 Thus, the doctrine has been applied to exclude a myriad
of cases from the courts' jurisdiction."
Acceptance of the domestic relations exception has not, however, been
universal. Critics of the exception focus on three specific issues: the doctrine's
source in dicta," its broad scope as applied by the federal courts today," and
the various justifications developed for it by these same courts.' 3 Despite these
criticisms, the domestic relations exception has remained well entrenched in
the law of federal courts. The courts appear to be unwilling to abolish it, absent
word from Congress or the Supreme Court to the contrary.•
Criticism of the exception is well taken. Despite its long history, there are
several reasons why the doctrine is, as currently applied, in need of re-
evaluation. First, the exception does not apply to all cases which involve family
members." Rather, it is applicable only to "true domestic relations claims. " 16
The federal courts have developed methods for determining whether such
"true claims" are present. These methods, however, are not satisfactory
because they cannot, in some cases, be applied consistently and because they
may produce results which are inequitable. Second, the justifications offered
for the doctrine by the federal courts are not convincing support for the doc-
trine. These justifications, whether based on jurisdictional" or policy
grounds," are either no longer valid, due to changes in the law of federal
courts, or based on fallacious reasoning. Thus, they do not justify a doctrine
which has developed from unexplained dicta and which has, in general, been
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 For examples of cases applying the domestic relations exception, see Sutter v. Pitts,
639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (suit to redress frustration of civil rights due to disobedience of
visitation and custody orders); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (suit to establish
paternity and child support); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967) (suit to
establish custody and visitation rights); Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.) (suit by il-
legitimate child against putative father to invalidate fraudulently obtained agreement), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947); Carqueville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1946) (habeas cor-
pus proceedings for child custody); Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Okla.
1969) (suit for division of marital assets); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967) (adop-
tion proceedings); Bercovitch v. Tanburn, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y 1952) (suit to recover
money for necessaries supplied to wife); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F..Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951)
(action to have property settlement declared void on grounds of fraud and duress); Garberson v.
Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (suit for maintenance).
" See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing).
32 See id.; Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Phillips
Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) (suggesting that
the domestic relations exception has been narrowly confined).
See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 806-10.
14 Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d
348, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1974); Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1391-92 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Colo. 1965).
'5 Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 '(4th Cir. 1980).
' 6 Id.
" See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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applied by the federal courts without sufficient reasoned explanation. Finally,
the validity of the domestic relations exception itself currently is being chal-
lenged. The recognition of federal constitutional rights pervading the field of
state law pertaining to the family has severely undermined the basic premise on
which the exception is based. 19 This trend signals the need to reconsider a doc-
trine based on the notion that resolution of family matters belongs solely to the
states, and not the federal government.
This note will suggest that the domestic relations exception ought to be
abolished. First, the note examines the historical development of the domestic
relations exception, tracing its origin to the dicta of two Supreme Court cases
decided in the nineteenth century. The development of this dicta into currently
held doctrine will then be explored. The post hoc justifications offered by
federal courts for both the dicta and the domestic relations exception it
spawned will be described, as will the methods developed by the federal courts
to determine what matters fall within the exception. This discussion will il-
lustrate that the domestic relations exception has grown into a well-established,
but inconsistent and confusing doctrine which excludes from federal diversity
jurisdiction controversies involving many different aspects of domestic law. In
the next section, an analysis of the domestic relations exception will be pre-
sented. The analysis will begin by critiquing the current application of the ex-
ception. First, the potential for undesirable outcomes inherent in the methods
of applying the exception will be illustrated. Second, the fallacies in the
justifications offered for the domestic relations exception will be addressed. It
will be submitted that problems in applying and justifying the exception sug-
gest the need to re-evaluate it. Then the analysis will proceed with a critique of
the theory behind the exception. A discussion of the recent trend in the area of
federal constitutional rights pervading the field of family law will be presented,
and the inconsistency of the exception with this trend will be suggested. This
note will argue that because the exception is based on a notion no longer
reflecting the reality of federal law regarding the family, it ought to be abol-
ished. Federal court jurisdiction should be extended to domestic controversies
which otherwise meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
While the domestic relations exception is, at present, well-entrenched in
the law of federal courts, this was not always the case. Rather, the exception as
currently applied by the courts is the product of a 125 year evolution, through
which the dicta of two Supreme Court cases has been reiterated, justified and
developed by the lower federal courts. An understanding of the reasons why
the exception is no longer valid requires first an understanding of how the ex-
ception has developed. Thus, before an argument for abolition of the exception
19 See infra notes 260-93 and accompanying text.
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is proffered, the historical development of it will be presented in three parts:
historical source, justifications, and application.
A. Historical Source
The domestic relations exception, invoked by the federal courts to exclude
from federal diversity jurisdiction a range of disputes falling within or closely
related to the field of domestic relations," has its source in Supreme Court dic-
ta. The Court first considered the role of federal courts in family law matters
over a century ago in Barber v. Barber."
Barber involved an appeal from an order issued from the equity side of the
United States district court for the district of Wisconsin. 22 The order mandated
that the defendant pay alimony due the plaintiff pursuant to a divorce decree
rendered by a New York state court." On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's decree. 24
 In doing so, the Court held that a divorce decree
from a state court having jurisidiction over the parties will have the same effect
in every state, and that such a decree may be enforced by the equity courts of
the United States." The Supreme Court prefaced its discussion of the case with
a caveat as to the scope of the federal courts' power in cases like the one
before it. The Court noted that the plaintiff had not asked the district court for
the allowance of alimony because alimony had already been granted by a state
court of competent jurisdiction. 26 Rather, the district court was asked only to
prevent that decree from being avoided by fraudulent behavior on the part of
the defendant." The Court then noted that federal courts do not have jurisdic-
tion over the subject of divorce or alimony." In this significant dicta" the Su-
20
 Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474,
475 (2d Cir. 1976). Some courts have, however, advocated a narrower scope of the exception. See
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982); Cole
v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
" 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
22
 Id. at 583.
" Id. at 587. The plaintiff, Huldah Barber, had previously made an application for a
divorce from the defendant, Hiram Barber, in the Court of Chancery for the fourth district of the
state of ,New York. Id. at 584-85. A decree of divorce a mensa et thorn (from bed and board) was
issued from that court, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $360 per year in support. Id.
at 585. Shortly after the decree was issued, the defendant left New York and established domicile
in Wisconsin. Id. at 584. He thereafter refused to make the payments ordered in the divorce
decree. Id. at 585. The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court in Wisconsin to enforce the
terms of the divorce decree. Id. at 586. She received from that court a decree ordering the defend-
ant to pay to the plaintiff $5,936.80, the alimony due at the time of suit, plus interest. Id. at 587.
" Id. at 600.
25 Id. at 591. The Court reached its decision by reasoning that because equity courts in
England had the power to enforce alimony decrees granted by the ecclesiastical courts, and
because the equity courts of the United States have the same jurisdiction as the English equity
courts, therefore United States equity courts may enforce state divorce decrees. Id. at 590-92.
26 Id. at 584.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
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preme Court laid the foundation for the principle that federal courts do not
have jurisdiction to hear domestic relations matters. This principle of no
jurisdiction, rather than the narrower Barber holding that federal jurisdiction
exists to enforce accrued alimony, has been repeatedly cited to and elaborated
on by federal courts."
The principle of no jurisdiction over claims for divorce or alimony enun-
ciated in Barber was broadened by the Supreme Court in In re Burrus. 3 ' In Bur-
rus, the Court entertained a writ of habeas corpus brought by Thomas Burrus,
who had been imprisoned for disobeying a child custody order issued by a
federal district court in a habeas corpus proceeding." Burrus argued that he
had been improperly imprisoned because the federal court did not have ju-
risdiction to hear the original habeas corpus proceeding, and, therefore, he
could not be imprisoned for disobeying the court."
The Supreme Court agreed with Burrus and issued the writ. 34 After
discussing the history of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court stated that the
United States courts, and the judges and justices of these courts, are authorized
to issue the writ of habeas corpus in any case in which a party is imprisoned or
held in custody in violation of a United States law, the Constitution, the law of
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery
or as an incident to divorce a vincula, or to one from bed and board." Id. The different types of
divorce were adopted from the English ecclesiastical courts which originally had exclusive
jurisdiction over divorce. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS S 11.1 at 281 (1968). Under
ecclesiastical law, true divorce could never be granted. Id. Divorce a vinculo was the predecessor
to modern suits to annul, Id. 3.1, at 119. Divorces a vinculo were freely given for impediments
existing when the parties married. Id. 5 11.1, at 281. Divorce from bed and board (divorce a men-
sa et thoro) was a limited divorce granted for adultery and cruelty. Id. Parties who received a
divorce from bed and board could not remarry. Id.
30
 Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41
MINN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1956). Federal courts have relied on Barber as grounds for the dismissal of
suits involving a variety of situations relating to divorce and other aspects of domestic law. See,
e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (suit to establish paternity and child
support); Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 1960) (enforcement of divorce decree
still subject to modification); Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Colo. 1965) (suit to
establish common law marriage); Manary v. Manary, 151 F. Supp. 446, 448 n. 3 (N.D. Cal.
1957) (suit to vacate divorce decree and for award of community property); Garberson v.
Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706, 709 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (suit for separation, support and custody);
Gonzales v. Gonzales, 74 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (suit to enforce support decree).
31
 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
32 Id. Burrus and his wife were the grandparents of a child born to Louis and Evelyn
Miller. Id. at 587. When Evelyn Miller took ill, Louis Miller asked the Burruses to care for the
child. Id. Evelyn Miller died, and Louis Miller remarried. Id. He tried to regain possession of the
child, but the Burruses refused to give back the child. Id. Miller applied to the district court in
Nebraska for a writ of habeas corpus to recover the child. Id. The district court held that the child
was improperly detained by the Burruses and ordered that Miller be given custody of the child.
Id. at 588. The Burruses initially delivered the child to Miller, but subsequently retook the child
by force from Miller's home in Ohio, and brought her to Nebraska. Id. Burrus was called before
the district court by a writ of attachment for contempt in disobeying the court, and was com-
mitted to jail for three months in the custody of the United States Marshall for Nebraska. Id, at
588-89.
" Id. at 589.
34 Id. at 597.
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nations, or a United States treaty." In considering whether such a requirement
was met in the habeas corpus proceeding to recover custody of the child, the
Court stated that the area of domestic relations between husband and wife, and
between parent and child, is one belonging to state and not federal law. 36
 The
right to control and possess a child does not, therefore, depend on an Act of
Congress, a treaty, the law of nations or the Constitution." As a result, the
Court held, the writ for custody of the child should not have been issued by a
federal court, and Burrus could not be imprisoned for disobeying it." As in
Barber, the Court cited no authority for the proposition that domestic law mat-
ters belong to the states.
In Burrus, the Supreme Court dealt with a habeas corpus proceeding that
had been brought in a federal district court. At the time that Burrus was decided,
district courts had limited jurisdictional powers that did not include general
diversity jurisdiction." The Burrus court specifically left open whether jurisdic-
tion over the writ would have been proper if the writ had been brought in a cir-
cuit court," which had original diversity jurisdiction.'" Nevertheless, federal
courts consistently have relied on the broad language of Burrus as precedent for
declining jurisdiction in diversity cases involving family related controversies."
The Supreme Court again considered the propriety of federal court
jurisdiction over domestic matters in three other cases decided shortly after
Burrus. Reiterating in these cases its broad disclaimer of jurisdiction over
domestic matters, the Court nevertheless recognized in the federal judiciary
power to hear domestic law controversies where jurisdiction is not based on
diversity of citizenship. In Simms v. Simms," the Supreme Court entertained an
appeal from the Supreme Court of the territory of Arizona, which had affirmed
a territorial district court's decision in a divorce action." There the Court reaf-
" Id. at 591.
"The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." Id. at 593-94.
" Id. at 594.
" Id. at 596.
39
 Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1032 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
At the time Burrus was decided, the circuit courts had general diversity jurisdiction. Ste supra note
3.
4° In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596 (1890).
41 C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, S 1, at 4. Diversity jurisdiction was not extended to the
federal district courts until 1911. See supra note 3.
42
 For examples of diversity cases citing Burrus as grounds for dismissal based on lack of
jurisdiction, see Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1978) (suit to determine title to
realty purchased during marriage); Gargallo v. Gargallo, 487 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1973) (suit for
perjury committed in divorce proceedings, conversion and malicious prosecution); Buechold v.
Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (suit to establish paternity); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt,
373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967) (suit involving dispute over visitation rights); Morris v. Morris,
273 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 1960) (suit to enforce separation agreement); Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F.
Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1973) (suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by
withholding support payments); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. La. 1967) (adoption
proceedings).
43
 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
" Id. at 163.
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firmed its language in Barber and Burros that domestic matters, including di-
vorce and alimony, are state and not federal concerns.'" The Court specified,
however, that this restriction did not apply to jurisdiction over domestic suits in
territorial district courts, or to appeals from the same." The Simms Court
therefore upheld its own appellate jurisdiction in the case. 47
Seven years later, the Court again considered a question of appellate
jurisdiction over domestic relations suits in De La Rama v. De La Rama." In De
La Rama, the Court upheld its appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the
Phillipines courts concerning domestic controversies." The Court stated once
again that the United States courts have no jurisdiction over divorce and
alimony. 50 This is so, the Court suggested, because the requirements of diversi-
ty jurisdiction cannot be met in domestic controversies." While reaffirming its
earlier dicta and offering for the first time a reason for the dicta, the De La Rama
Court nevertheless held that such a limitation did not apply to appeals from the
Phillipine courts." The De La Rama court alluded to a possible rationale for this
distinction. The Court suggested, as it had in Simrnc, 53 that the role of the
federal legislature and presumably the federal courts as well, in the territories is
that analogous to state, and not federal, government. 54 The Court suggested,
therefore, that the considerations in Barber and Burros, which distinguish be-
tween state and federal roles in domestic matters, do not apply in territorial
cases and appeals from the same. 55
The Supreme Court's final significant decision addressing the scope of
federal jurisdiction over domestic relations matters was Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler. 56 Popovici involved a suit brought in the Supreme Court for a writ of pro-
hibition to stop a divorce action instituted by the wife of a foreign vice consul in
a state court. 57 The petitioner argued that because Congress had granted to
4 ' Id. at 167.
66 Id. at 167-68.
" Id. at 168.
46 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
49 Id. at 308. De La Rama involved an appeal from a divorce suit brought in a Court of
First Instance in the Phillipines. Id. at 304.
5° Id, at 307.
" Id. The Court offered two reasons for the statement. First, husbands and wives could
not, historically, be citizens of different states for purposes of establishing diverse citizenship so
long as the marriage relationship continued. Id. This is so because at common law, the legal ex-
istence of a wife was incorporated into that of her husband, thus destroying her capacity to
establish domicile independent of his. CLARK, supra note 29, S 4.3, at 149. Second, the Court
noted, a suit for divorce itself involves no pecuniary value. De La Rama v. De La Rarna, 201
U.S. at 307. Thus, the jurisdictional amount could not be met.
32 Id. at 308.
53 Simms V. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899).
54 De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 308 (1906).
55 Id. By recognizing federal court jurisdiction over such cases, the Court effectively
limited the broad disclaimer previously proclaimed in Barber and Burros to cases based on diversi-
ty jurisdiction, an interpretation of the exception currently followed by the federal courts. C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, S 3609, at 662.
56 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
57 Id. at 379. The petitioner's wife had originally brought the action in federal court,
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federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all suits and proceedings against vice
consuls, the divorce could be maintained only in a United States court. 58 The
Supreme Court -held that the state court could grant the divorce and denied the
writ." In doing so, the Court reasoned that the "suits against consuls and vice
consuls" referred to in the federal jurisdictional statute 5° encompassed only
"ordinary civil proceedings," and not matters formerly heard by the ec-
clesiastical courts."
In summary, the Supreme Court, through its dicta in Barber and Burrus, and
later in Popovici, laid the foundation for a domestic relations exception to di-
versity jurisdiction of the federal courts. While the Court's decisions in Simms
and Dc La Rama limited the broad disclaimer promulgated in Barber and Burrus
by recognizing jurisdiction in non-diversity cases, the disclaimer nevertheless
remained applicable to domestic controversies based on diversity jurisdiction.
The failure of the Supreme Court to explain fully the disclaimer, however, left
an opportunity for the lower courts to supply a convincing rationale for apply-
ing the exception to cases presumably meeting the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction. Thus, the next phase in the evolution of the domestic relations ex-
ception involved the development of justifications for the exception by the
lower federal courts.
B. Justifications for the Domestic Relations Exception
In neither Barber. nor Burrus did the Supreme Court give any reasons why
federal courts may not hear domestic controversies." Justifications for the ex-
but this suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Popovici v. Popovici, 30 F.2d 185 (N.D. Ohio
1927).
" Id. at 382. The petitioner relied on the statutory and constitutional grants of power to
the federal courts: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; ..." U.S. CONST. art. III, 2; "The jurisdiction vested in
the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be ex-
clusive of the courts of the several States ... Of all suits and proceedings against ... consuls or
vice consuls." Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 5 256, 36 Stat. 1160-61.
" Ohio ex. rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930).
6° See the relevant language of the statute noted supra note 58.
" Ohio ex rd. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930). In construing the statute
granting to the federal courts exclusive authority to hear suits against vice consuls, the Court,
relying on the dicta in Barber and Burrus, considered the assumptions operative at the time the
statute was passed. Id. at 383. The Court noted that when the Constitution was adopted,
domestic matters were commonly understood as reserved for regulation by the states. Id. at
383-84. This is so, the Court implied, because the power to hear divorce and other domestic mat-
ters, originally vested in English ecclesiastical courts, had passed to the states. Id. at 384. See
CLARK, supra note 29, $ 2.2, at 35. See also Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806-10
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing ecclesiastical power over domestic matters). Thus, the Court deter-
mined, the term "suits against consuls and vice consuls" incorporated in the statute defining the
federal courts' jurisdiction was meant to encompass only "ordinary civil proceedings" and not
matters formerly belonging to the ecclesiastical courts. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. at
384.
62 That the Supreme Court's dicta is unsupported by authority is, in fact, a primary
focus of the doctrine's critics. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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ception, however, have subsequently been offered by the federal courts. These
justifications may be classified as either jurisdictional or policy-based in nature.
Generally stated, the jurisdictional justifications for the domestic relations
exception are premised on a notion that "constitutional or statutory infirm-
ities" restrict a federal court's power to decide matters involving domestic rela-
tions. 63
 Federal courts focusing on the constitutional infirmities have reasoned
that the power to grant divorces or determine collateral matters such as child
custody and support—originally existing in the English sovereign" or the
ecclesiastical courts"—did not pass to the federal government at the time of its
creation. 66 Specifically, these courts hold that because the federal government
is one of limited, enumerated powers, and because the power to regulate the
dissolution of marriage is not specifically conferred on the federal government
in the Constitution," only the state courts may decide such matters."
In other cases, federal courts have justified application of the domestic
relations exception on statutory grounds." First, some courts have suggested
that the Supreme Court's broad disclaimer of jurisdiction over divorce in Barber
was based on the fact that the Judiciary Code at the time granted to the federal
courts jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity. " 7 °
Because divorce and alimony historically did not fall within either category,"
there could be no federal court jurisdiction over such matters. Second, the
Supreme Court itself noted that historically, husbands and wives could not
establish the diverse citizenship required by the federal diversity statute, thus
precluding diversity jurisdiction in suits between spouses." Third, several
63 Vestal & Foster, supra note 30, at 27.
" See Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F. 818, 821 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904) (citing Fontain v.
Ravenal, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854)); CLARK, supra note 29, $ 11.2, at 286.
" See Ohio ex re/ Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930); Spindel v. Spindel, 283
F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
66 De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 304 (1906).
67 "The Constitution of the United States confers no power whatever upon the govern-
ment of the United States to regulate marriage in the States or its dissolution...." Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 32 (1903). See also In re Wilson, 314 F. Supp. 271, 272 (E.D. Tenn. 1970)
(federal courts have no jurisdiction over divorce because Constitution grants no power to na-
tional government to regulate dissolution of marriage).
68 The Federal tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the
different members of private families in their domestic intercourse. This power belongs ex-
clusively to the particular communities of which these families form parts...." Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 602 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting). See also Williamson v.
Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (domestic relations matters reserved to
the states).
69 See Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967); Clifford v. Williams,
131 F. 100, 102 (C.C.D. Wash. 1904).
'° Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25, at 97. The relevant language of the statute is noted supra note 2.
" Rather, such actions were part of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25 at 97. But cf. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 806-09 (critiquing
historical basis of such a distinction by arguing that temporal courts as well as ecclesiastical courts
in England had jurisdiction over divorce and alimony).
72 De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906).
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courts have held that domestic matters are incapable of meeting the re-
quirements of the federal diversity statute because they cannot be assigned a
pecuniary value." Without such value they cannot satisfy the requisite $10,000
amount in controversy. 74 For example, in a habeas corpus proceeding to gain
custody of a child, where no amount in controversy has been alleged, one court
held that the custody of a child cannot be assigned a monetary value and that
without such assignable value no federal diversity jurisdiction existed."
In addition to these constitutional and statutory bases, policy reasons have
been offered to justify the domestic relations exception. First, several courts
have focused on the competence of the state courts in family law matters."
These courts have exhibited great deference to state court expertise in the area
of domestic relations, based on the fact that state courts have had years of ex-
perience in dealing with domestic relations matters on a daily basis." Second,
the exception has been upheld as a way to keep domestic relations matters
under a uniform system of state regulation and control." Support for such
uniformity is found in a perceived strong state interest in such matters." And
finally other courts have advanced the argument that because of overcrowded
dockets in the federal courts, matters of domestic relations ought to be
relegated to state court forums." Under this rationale, purely practical con-
siderations of the effects of allowing federal courts to hear domestic law matters
are offered to justify the exception.
In summary, federal courts have offered constitutional, statutory and policy
reasons for the domestic relations exception. Both the Constitution's grant of
limited powers to the federal government and the apparent inability of
domestic relations cases to meet the requirements of the diversity statute have
been relied on to uphold the exception. In addition, the exception has been
supported by policy concerns such as the state courts' special expertise in
domestic relations matters, the states' seemingly stronger interest in these mat-
ters, and the effect on already crowded federal dockets of granting a federal
forum to domestic relations cases.
" See id..
" See Clifford v. Williams, 131 F. at 102.
75 Id.
76 Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); Magaziner v. Montemoro,
468 F.2d 782, 787 (3rd Cir. 1972); Buechold v. Ortiz 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25, at 97.
" Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d at 373; Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D,
Or. 1973); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, 5 3609, at 663. But cf. Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d at 488 (suggesting that state competence always present in diversity suits, not
merely in domestic matters).
78 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 509
(1954).
79 Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp.
1019, 1020-21 (D. Or. 1973).
80 Rosensti e 1, 490 F.2d at 514; Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977);
Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976).
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C. Application of the Domestic Relations Exception
Development in the reasoning behind the domestic relations exception has
been accompanied by changes in application of the exception. This evolution is
due in part to the vagueness of the Supreme Court's dicta. While in Barber,
only federal court jurisdiction over divorce and alimony was denied," the
scope of the disclaimer was extended to the general category of domestic mat-
ters between family members in Burros. es
 The development of the excep-
tion has, consequently, been marked with attempts of the federal courts to deal
with the difficult question of what controversies fall within this broad dis-
claimer of domestic matters. Such attempts have resulted in the development of
divergent and sometimes inconsistent approaches for applying the exception.
While the federal courts agree that federal diversity jurisdiction does not
extend to domestic controversies, the most difficult problem in dealing with the
exception has been determining what constitutes a domestic matter embraced
by the exception." Some courts, for example, view suits to void agreements
between spouses," suits to divide marital assets," and suits to recover for torts
committed during the marriage 86
 or the divorce" as falling within the domestic
relations exception." Other courts, however, have determined that suits re-
" Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
82 In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
83
 The exact scope of the doctrine is unclear. Some federal courts have adopted a nar-
row interpretation of the exception. See, e.g., Cole, 633 F.2d at 1088 ("A district court may not
simply avoid all diversity cases having intrafarnilial aspects. Rather, it must consider the exact
nature of the rights asserted or of the breaches alleged."); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797,
812 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("A federal court is not deprived of competence merely because the parties
involved are husband and wife or the controversy might be termed a "marital dispute."). Other
federal courts, however, have adopted a broader view, abstaining from hearing claims closely
related to, though not technically within, the exception. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842,
843 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[A]lthough the exception has been narrowly confined, we, and other courts
of appeals, have held that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating claims that are closely
related to, though not within, the jurisdictional exception. "); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474,
475 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[A] federal court may still decline jurisdiction if the action is 'on the verge'
of the exception.... ").
84 See Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (action to have prop-
erty settlement set aside on grounds of fraud and duress).
n See Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 516 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
86 See Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1019 (D. Or. 1973) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
" See Gargallo v, Gargallo, 487 F.2d 914, 914 (6th Cir. 1973) (perjury, conversion and
malicious prosecution).
88
 Jurisdiction has been denied as well in other cases involving domestic matters. See
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (action to obtain custody and visitation rights);
Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (action seeking child support); Ostrom v.
Ostrom, 231 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1955) (divorce action); Carqueville, 153 F.2d at 1011 (habeas cor-
pus proceedings); Walpert v. Walpert, 329 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1971) (action to establish
marital status); hi re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482, 482 (E.D. La. 1967) (adoption proceedings);
Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754, 754 (D. Colo. 1965) (action seeking to enforce the provisions
of a divorce decree); Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706, 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (action to
establish alimony).
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questing enforcement of a defaulting spouse's obligation under a valid state
divorce decree, 89 suits requesting action on separation contracts between
spouses,9° and tort actions involving family members, 91 are not domestic rela-
tions matters." In an effort to make distinctions between what does and does
not fall within the exception, courts and commentators have implicitly or ex-
plicitly suggested several approaches."
One approach suggested by the courts might be referred to as a "nature of
the case" approach. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Cole v. Cole" adopts this approach. Cole involved a suit against the plaintiff's
former wife, a deputy sheriff, and a policeman." The complaint alleged causes
of action for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conspiracy, conversion,
arson, and assault and battery." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint, a dismissal based in part on the
domestic relations exception. 97 The Cole court recognized the need for federal
courts to distinguish between matters which are genuinely matters of divorce,
alimony or custody and thus belong within the exception, and those which are
not." The court noted that all "family feuds" do not fall within the "special-
ized category of true domestic relations cases" and that, therefore, a federal
district court may not avoid all diversity cases with "intrafamily aspects." 99
Rather, a federal court must consider the "exact nature" of the wrong asserted
to determine whether the case may be heard in federal court.'" Finding that
89 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, S 3609, at 670. See, e.g., Barber
v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590 (1858).
98 See Jones v. Jones, 242 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Richie v. Richie, 186 F.
Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
93 ,See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (suit by children against father's
paramour for damages resulting from alienation of affection); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp.
797, 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (suit seeking damages for fraud in inducing marriage and in procuring
Mexican divorce).
92 Federal courts will, as well, enforce state decrees under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution, and invalidate state divorce decrees obtained by fraud or unsupported by
subject matter or personal jurisdiction. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6,
3609, at 671. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 567 (1906); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730
(2d Cir. 1962).
95 The names of these approaches discussed infra notes 94-130 and accompanying text
are labels used by the author for purposes of discussion only. These labels have been derived
from the discussions of the domestic relations exception by various courts and commentators.
94 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
95 Id. at 1084.
96 Id. at 1085-87.
97 Id. at 1092. Specifically, the count for malicious prosecution and abuse of process,
and the count for arson, conspiracy and conversion were dismissed by the district court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, due to the operation of the domestic relations exception. Id. at 1087.
A third count was dismissed on the merits, and summary judgment for the defendants was
granted as to the assault and battery count. Id.
98 Id. at 1088.
99 Id.
too id.
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none of the counts presented any true domestic claims, the Cole court remanded
the case for further proceedings.' 01
The nature of the case approach' 02 involves looking closely at the actual
dispute involved and considering the relation of the subject matter to domestic
concerns.'" Using such an approach, courts have tried to decide whether the
rights involved ought to be brought witin federal diversity jurisdiction despite
the fact that such rights arise out of domestic relations settings.'" This ap-
proach allows for the grant of jurisdiction to suits for fraud'° 5 and other torts,'"
and suits in contract,'" because such suits involve rights normally existing out-
side the marital relationship. Likewise, the nature of the case approach allows
denial of jurisdiction to actions involving divorce, custody rights, and
support. 108
Federal courts, however, have been unwilling to determine the family
status of parties.'" This unwillingness has suggested to commentators a second
approach for applying the domestic relations exception: the "property-status"
distinction."° Under the property-status approach, cases involving a deter-
mination of status should not be heard by the federal courts, while those cases
involving property rights where no question of status is involved should be
heard.t' This analysis explains the lack of jurisdiction in suits for divorce," 2
suits involving habeas corpus petitions for custody,'" adoption proceedings, "4
and actions to establish parental 115 or maritall" status. In such cases, a federal
court is asked primarily to determine what the relationship between the parties
should be. Because such status matters are not conducive to pecuniary settle-
1 °' Id. at 1092.
' 0 ' For cases adopting this approach see, e.g., id. at 1088; Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp.
592, 594 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
1 °' See, e.g., Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. at 805.
104 See, e.g., Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp. 592, 594 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
L° 5 See, e.g., Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
106
 See Dailey v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
107 See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 486 (5th Cir. 1978); Richie v. Richie, 186 F.
Supp. 592, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
Loe See cases cited supra at note 88. Denial of jurisdiction in these cases is proper because
the rights involved exist only within a familial context.
iO4 "Federal courts will accept jurisdiction to a very limited extent in the domestic area
... but they have consistently refused to hear any action seeking a determination of marital and
parental status." in re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. La. 1967). See also Buechold v. Or-
tiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (arguing no federal court jurisdiction in cases involving
status of husband and wife or parent and child).
"° See Vestal & Foster, supra note 30, at 23-31.
L" Id. at 31. But see Brandscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (re-
jecting property-status approach and adopting policy approach); Note, Federal Jurisdiction of
"Domestic Relations" Cases, 7 J. OF FAM. L. 309, 314-15 (1967) (discussing policy approach ad-
vocated in Brandscheii).
"' See In re Wilson, 314 F. Supp. 271, 271 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
113 See Carqueville v. Woodruff, 153 F.2d 1011, 1011 (6th Cir. 1946).
114 See In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482, 482 (E.D. La. 1967).
" 5 See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
116 See Walpert, 329 F. Supp. at 25.
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ment, this approach suggests that they fail to meet the $10,000 minimum
amount in controversy statutory jurisdictional requirement.'"
On the other hand, the property-status approach suggests that federal
courts should decide conflicts between family members involving property
rights, where such conflicts are separate from status determinations." 8 Under
this approach, cases upholding jurisdiction in actions to enforce alimony
payments in divorce or separation decrees, 18
 and actions to collect damages for
a breach of a separation agreementl" were correctly decided, despite the rela-
tionship of these suits to the marital relationship, because only property ques-
tions were involved. In the view of commentators, this approach suggests also
that suits to establish maintenance"' and support,' 22 brought outside the con-
text of a divorce action, should be heard; such cases involve property and not
status questions.'" According to the property-status approach, allowing fed-
eral courts to decide property questions is appropriate because the Supreme
Court, despite its promulgation of the domestic relations exception, has
recognized that property and status matters are distinct. 124
 They should,
therefore, be treated separately.'" Thus, assuming correctly or incorrectly that
states have the exclusive right to determine status matters, as suggested by the
federal courts' consistent application of the domestic relations exception to
such matters, such exclusive jurisdiction ought not be afforded over property
questions merely because they arise out of the same factual situation as do
status questions. 126
A third approach for applying the domestic relations exception might be
labeled the "determine-enforce" approach. This approach was first suggested
by the Supreme Court itself in Barber v. Barber.'" In Barber, while disclaiming
jurisdiction over divorces and alimony, the Supreme Court nevertheless up-
held the federal courts' equity jurisdiction to enforce a state divorce decree, to
the extent of the amount due under the state decree. 128
 This is the case, the
" 7 Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1969); Walpert, 329 F. Supp. at 26.
"e Vestal & Foster, supra note 30, at 31.
"9 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 583 (1858).
152 See Richie v. Richie, 186 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
121 Cf. Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706, 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949) (no jurisdiction
over suit to establish maintenance).
122 Cf. Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688, 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947)
(no jurisdiction over support action).
125 Vestal & Foster, supra note 30 at 29.
124 In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888), the Supreme Court noted that while
state legislatures have an interest in regulating the end of the marital relationship, any legislative
action declaring a divorce which interfered with property rights would present a "different ques-
tion." This language had been interpreted as suggesting that any exclusive state control over




' 2 ' See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
121 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590-91 (1858).
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Court noted, where alimony has been awarded and where no appeal is pend-
ing.' 2° Federal courts have followed the Court's determine-enforce approach in
suits to enforce alimony payments due under state decrees, where such decrees
have been rendered by competent state courts."°
The differing approaches in applying the domestic relations exception are
indicative of the confusion among federal courts about the exception's scope
and purpose. The efforts of the courts to define what matters are properly ex-
cluded from diversity jurisdiction under the exception has led to the develop-
ment of three different approaches. While all three approaches are established
in federal court precedent as guidelines for applying the domestic relations ex-
ception, their varying concerns raise the possibility of inconsistent results, de-
pending on the particular approach employed. The problems inherent in using
these approaches, as well as the problems with the exception's justifications
and basic premise, will be explored in the following analysis.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EXCEPTION'S CONTINUING VIABILITY
Despite its long tenure in federal court jurisprudence, there are problems
with the domestic relations exception. These problems are three-fold. First, the
approaches developed by the courts to apply the doctrine are not satisfactory.
These approaches establish bright-line tests for determining what matters
should and should not be excluded from federal diversity jurisdiction. Yet, the
three approaches may not be applied consistently with one another and may
yield irrational results. The first part of this analysis will present two cases
which illustrate the potential for inconsistent and irrational results when these
approaches are applied to one area of domestic law. Second, the potential for
unsatisfactory outcomes under the exception suggests that the exception itself
needs to be re-evaluated. In the second part of this analysis, the justifications
for the domestic relations exception will be explored. It will be argued that the
justifications for the exception are no longer compelling. Finally, the third part
of this dicussion will analyze the basic premise underlying the domestic rela-
tions exception. It will be suggested that the domestic relations exception
originated prior to a recent trend recognizing federal constitutional rights per-
vading state laws which directly or indirectly regulate the family. This trend in
the role of federal courts in family law is inconsistent with the basic tenet of the
domestic relations exception: that family law matters belong solely to the
states. It will be argued, therefore, that to maintain a consistency in ap-
proaching family law, federal courts should no longer decline jurisdiction based
on the domestic relations exception, and the exception should be abolished.
125 Id. at 591.
I3° See, e.g., Gonzales v. Gonzales, 74 F. Supp. 883, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1947), See also Ben-
nett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (applying
determine-enforce approach to child custody decree). Fur a more complete discussion of both this
case and the determine-enforce approach, see infra notes 160-209 and accompanying text.
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A. Critique of the Application of the Domestic
Relations Exception
Two recent federal court cases have addressed the domestic relations ex-
ception in the context of a tort suit brought to redress a child snatching. These
cases, Wasserman v. Wasserman"' and Bennett v. Bennettm illustrate both the
three approaches used to determine the exception's scope and the problems
with the approaches.
Wasserman is the earlier of the two cases. The plaintiff, Sylvia Wasserman,
was the former wife of the defendant, Irwin Wasserman.'" The plaintiff had
been granted custody of the couple's four children by the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland in 1976.' 34 Shortly thereafter, the defendant
removed the couple's children from the plaintiff's custody and took them out-
side the state of Maryland.'" The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant,
his present wife, his parents and his attorneys, alleging that the defendants' ac-
tion gave rise to causes of action for child enticement, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and civil conspiracy.'" The district court dismissed the suit
on grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the domestic
relations exception."'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings.'" In an opinion written by Judge Ingraham,
the Wasserman court recognized the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction in
a tort suit arising out of an abduction by one parent of a child in the custody of
the other.'" Specifically, the Wasserman court held that the domestic relations
exception does not preclude jurisdiction over a claim for damages in a tort ac-
tion to redress a child snatching. 140 The court's reasoning rested on two
grounds. First, the court adhered to the "nature of the case" approach to ap-
plication of the domestic relations exception announced in the court's earlier
Cole v. Cole decision."' Second, the court focused on whether resolution of the
case involved an adjustment of family status, implicitly conducting a
"property-status" inquiry into the exception's scope. 142
In Cole, the Fourth Circuit had alluded to a two-part inquiry in applying
the nature of the case approach. The first element of the Cole analysis centers
13 ' 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982).
12 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).





'" Id. at 834.
138 Id. at 835.
"2 Id. at 834.
14(2 Id.
141 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980). See also supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
'" Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982). The property-status approach is discussed supra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
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on the parties to the action. The focus of the inquiry is whether the claims could
only be brought between family members, or whether the claims could have
arisen between strangers. 143
 Using this line of inquiry, the Wasserman court
noted that actions for child enticement and intentional infliction of emotional
distress could be brought—and actually were brought in the case of the defend-
ants other than the plaintiff's husband—against those with no familial relation-
ship to the plaintiff.'" Thus, in the court's view, jurisdiction ought not be ex-
cluded. 145 The Wasserman court's reasoning is consistent with Cole, which had
also involved causes of action against both a spouse and non-family mem-
bers. 146
The second element of the Cole analyis centers on the nature of the action
itself. The focus of the inquiry is whether a particular action requires for its
resolution the existence of any rule of law particularly marital in nature."'
Conducting this inquiry on the facts before it, the Wasserman court noted that
outside the law of domestic relations, a tort action for child snatching would be
cognizable under claims for child enticement or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.'" According to the court, these claims are in no way dependent
on a present or prior family relationship. 149
 While it did not so state directly,
the Wasserman court implied that because federal courts generally may and do
hear tort suits, the tortious nature of the claim itself entitled the parties to
litigate in federal court. 15 ° Its decision to uphold jurisdiction over the action
before it is thus consistent with Cole, which had upheld jurisdiction over other
tortious actions."'
Having established that jurisdiction would lie under the "nature of the
case" analysis suggested in Cole, the Wasserman court went on to discuss a
second—possibly more compelling—ground for granting jurisdiction in child
snatching cases. The court noted that in granting jurisdiction for damages
caused by a child snatching, it was not being asked to make a "determination
of entitlement to custody or any other adjustment of family status. "152 The
143 Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980).
"4
 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982).
1 " Id.
146 Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1084 (4th Cir. 1980).
'" Id. at 1088.
148
 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 103 S. Ct.
372 (1982) (citing Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Harris v. Jones, 281
Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1979)).
149 Wasserman v. Wasserman 671 F.2d at 835.
"° See id. at 834. The Wasserman court cited Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp, 15, 18-21
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), as authority for the proposition that actions in tort lie for child enticement and
intentional infliction of emotional distress to redress a child snatching. It at 834 n.2. In Kajtazi, a
federal district court granted damages to both parent and child as a result of a child snatching,
without any discussion of the domestic relations exception. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. at
21
151 Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980).
152
 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982).
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court thus distinguished the case before it from cases in which the result would
be a declaration of present or future rights as to custody or visitation.'"
Whether Mrs. Wasserman was entitled to custody for the period relevant to the
complaint, the court observed, had already been decided by a state court."'"
Furthermore, according to the court, custody for the relevant period was not
subject to challenge by the parties, because the suit dealt with custody during a
period already passed, and not with future custody rights.'" The Wasserman
court noted further that Cole had recognized the power of federal courts to
determine both the validity of a state court decree and duties established by
such a decree.'" Because such action did not require an intrusive inquiry into
the domestic relations of the parties, the Wasserman court upheld jurisdiction to
determine damages caused by Irwin Wasserman's having disobeyed the cus-
tody order in the state decree.'"
The Wasserman court was careful to distinguish between determining the
status of the parties in a dispute and simply giving effect to a previously deter-
mined status. In Wasserman, the court upheld jurisdiction because no status
determination was involved. While the court did not explicitly purport to
follow the property-status approach, the decision to hear this non-status matter
can be explained by this approach. In distinguishing the case before it from
other cases concerning status, 18 the Wasserman court analogized the case before
it to actions to collect money due under divorce decrees.'" These latter cases
clearly involve property questions, and the Wasserman suit as well involved a re-
quest for property in the form of damages incurred from a child snatching.
Thus, while the court did not explicitly apply the property-status approach, it
did so implicitly by stating that what it faced was not a status matter, and by
characterizing the action as one redressing the breached rights of one party
through a property settlement with the other. The Wasserman court therefore
reached its decision to uphold jurisdiction on two alternative but harmonious
grounds, based on the "nature of the case" and "property-status ap-
proaches."
Shortly after Wasserman was decided, another Circuit Court of Appeals
faced a similar case involving a child snatching tort in Bennett u. Bennett . 1 " The
plaintiff, Thomas Bennett, and the defendant, Patricia Bennett, were parents




'6 Id. (citing Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087 (4th Cir. 1980)).
15 ' Id. at 835.
In Id. citing Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1981); Gargallo v. Gargallo, 472 F.2d
1219 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 316 (2d
Cir. 1967).
159 671 F.2d at 835 citing Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981); Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 486 (5th Cir. 1978); Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976).
is° 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
161 Id. at 1041.
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the children by an Ohio state court. 162 Four years later, the defendant turned
over custody of two of the children to the plaintiff, who brought the children to
his home in the District of Columbia.'" The plaintiff brought suit in Superior
Court for the District of Columbia, and was granted formal custody of the two
children.'" Subsequently, the defendant abducted the two children from the
plaintiff's home.'" While the plaintiff was successful in retaking one of the two
snatched children, he was unable to recover the other.'"
The plaintiff thereafter sought legal redress against the defendant. In ad-
dition to a contempt proceeding in the District of Columbia Superior Court,' 67
the plaintiff sued the defendant in federal district court in the District of
Columbia.'" In this suit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's taking of the
children constituted a tort, and that he was entitled to monetary damages in the
amount of $525,000. 169
 The plaintiff also asked for an injunction "directing
and enjoining the defendant from any interference with the custody rights of
the plaintiff. ''"° The plaintiff's complaint, however, failed to state the basis for
personal jurisdiction over the defendant."' The district court noted this
"jurisdictional flaw" and dismissed the complaint, refusing thereafter to con-
sider the plaintiff's amended complaint.'"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed the lower court on the issue of personal jurisdiction.'" The Court,
however, first considered an issue that neither the lower court nor the parties
had addressed: whether the suit could be heard under the court's diversity
jurisdiction, due to the operation of the domestic relations exception. 74
 Judge
Bazelon, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, subdivided this issue into
a discussion of jurisdiction over the monetary damages requested and the in-
junctive relief sought. The court held that a district court does have jurisdiction
to grant a plaintiff monetary relief from a child snatching.'" The court held
further, however, that a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to pro-
vide injunctive relief in such a case.'" The Bennett court remanded the case for
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denial of jurisdiction over the request for injunctive relief." 7
In its decision to uphold jurisdiction over the claim for monetary damages,
the Bennett court specifically adopted the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit as set
forth in Wasserman.' 78 The court thus accepted the nature of the case and
property-status approaches as applied in the Wasserman decision. In expound-
ing upon the nature of the case approach, the Bennett court reasoned that
federal courts do not exceed their competence by hearing suits whose essence is
in tort or contract. 179 In particular, the Bennett court noted, the determination of
traditional tort issues, such as duty, breach of duty, and damages, has always
been within the federal courts' competence.'" Noting that the task of deter-
mining the validity and effect of state decrees is also within a federal court's
competence, the Bennett court upheld jurisdiction to redress breach of such
duties even where they are enumerated in a state decree."'
The Bennett court faced no difficulty in applying the Wasserman approach to
the claim for monetary damages. According to the Court, this claim is the type
of action that federal courts do hear and can, therefore, be deemed to fall out-
side the scope of the domestic relations exception. 182 On the question of injunc-
tive relief, however, the Bennett court found the Wasserman decision to be in-
conclusive, because Wasserman involved only retrospective relief.' 83 In fact,
Judge Bazelon noted, the Wasserman court specifically relied on the fact that the
action for damages was not one in which the parties actually seek a declara-
tion of present or future rights as to custody or visitation."'" Injunctive relief,
the Bennett court noted, is prospective and thus necessitates inquiries which a
federal court may not have the power to make.'" The court observed that an
injunction does not involve addressing past wrongs through a grant of mone-
tary (property) damages.' 86 Rather, the court reasoned, deciding whether to
grant an injunction necessitates an inquiry into the present interests of the
children.'" Recognizing that such determinations are peculiarly within the
province of state courts, 188 and recognizing that allowing federal courts to make
such determinations would undermine the domestic relations exception, 189 the
'" Id.
178






184 Id. (quoting Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 372 (1982)).
'as Id. at 1042.
' 86 Id.
197 Id. Such an inquiry is necessary when a court issues equitable relief, because the in-
terests of third parties must be considered in deciding whether to grant an injunction. RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 942 (1979).
188 Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042-43.
189 Id. at 1043.
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court declined to grant jurisdiction over the claim for injunctive relief.'"
Close analysis of the reasoning behind the decision to deny jurisdiction
over injunctive relief in Bennett reveals a shift away from the dual approach con-
ducted in Wasserman and adopted by the Bennett court in its decision to uphold
jurisdiction over monetary damages. The shift is towards an analysis relying
solely on the property-status approach. The Bennett court did not address the
issue of injunctive relief in terms of the inquiries characterizing the nature of
the case approach. Had the court done so, it would have first considered the
need for a family relationship between the parties."' A claim for injunctive
relief from a child snatching could have been brought between non-family
members as well as between family members. Next, the court would have ad-
dressed the rule of law involved in the case.'" The court would have deter-
mined that the rules of law governing relief from a child enticement and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress are derived from tort law, and not do-
mestic law. Thus, under these two inquiries, the Bennett court would have
upheld jurisdiction. The Bennett court's inquiry into whether diversity jurisdic-
tion exists over the requested injunctive relief lacks any consideration of these
issues. Rather, the court's decision to deny such jurisdiction is based solely on
the fact that injunctions mandate determinations of the interests of the parties
involved.' 93 Such determinations are status determinations. The court based
its decision to deny jurisdiction on the reasoning that these status determina-
tions are outside the competence of the federal courts.'"
The failure of the court to use the nature of the case approach may be ex-
plained in two ways. First, the nature of the case approach would not have
been helpful in deciding whether both types of relief could be properly granted
by a federal court. In considering whether jurisdiction existed over the claim
for monetary damages, the Bennett court had already decided that the tort suit
before it is the type of case that may be heard in federal court. The inquiries
mandated by the approach did not change, nor did the answers to them, in
considering the issue of injunctive relief. Thus, the nature of the case approach
did not address the more difficult question of whether the type of relief requested
is consistent with the domestic relations exception. The Bennett court, however,
found differences in retrospective and prospective relief, and a need to consider
them.
Secondly, use of the nature of the case approach would have given a result
clearly inconsistent with that under the property-status approach. Had the
court applied the nature of the case inquiries to the issue of injunctive relief, it
would have concluded that jurisdiction was proper, because the approach does
' 9' Id. at 1044.
19 ' See Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
372 (1982); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1088 (4th Cir. 1980).
'" See id.
'" Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042.
' 94 /d.
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not distinguish between the types of relief possible in a lawsuit. The property-
status approach does, however, recognize the inherent differences between
retrospective and prospective relief. This approach labels monetary damages as
property questions and retrospective relief as status questions, and deems fed-
eral courts competent to answer only the former. Because the Bennett court
realized the need to address the inherent differences in prospective and
retrospective relief, and because only the property-status approach addressed
this need, the Bennett court ignored the nature of the case approach.
The decision in Bennett is important in two respects. First, it demonstrates
that the different approaches for applying the domestic relations exception are
not as easily reconciled as Wasserman suggests. Unlike the Bennett court, the
Wasserman court did not face a problem in using both approaches to reach its
decision because the result was the same under each approach. Wasserman is
representative of an easy case, in which the approaches established in prece-
dent may be applied harmoniously. Bennett, on the other hand, though factually
similar to Wasserman, represents a harder case, in which the approaches cannot
be consistently applied, and in which a court must ignore one line of precedent
in order to decide the case. Bennett illustrates the problems that a federal court
may face in having to manipulate the approaches in order to reach a result
which the court believes best follows precedent. This potential for difficulty in
applying the approaches is a major drawback of the domestic relations excep-
tion.
More important than the problem of reconciling possibly conflicting ap-
proaches, however, is the potential for irrational results under the exception as
illustrated in Bennett. The plaintiff in Bennett met the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction. Yet, he could not seek all the relief he was, in theory, entitled to
seek.'" As noted in the dissenting opinion in Bennett, the court's decision will
allow the Bennett plaintiff only to sue repeatedly for damages, without getting
his child back.'" This situation, in effect, allows the defendant to rent her
child, at a cost equal to the successive awards of damages.'" Such a result
would be impossible if the suit had been brought against someone other than a
family member. Moreover, if such a suit had been brought in a state court,
jurisdiction would lie over both claims for relief. By upholding jurisdiction over
only one of the claims for relief, the Bennett court ensured that a person will ob-
tain different results depending on whether he files in state or federal courts.
This follows from the fact that had the claim been brought in state court, both
claims could have been heard. Because the suit was brought in federal court
only a damage claim could be heard in that suit; a separate claim for injunctive
relief would have to have been brought in state court. While the relief finally
given the plaintiff may be the same in both cases, considerations of the addi-
1 " Additionally, injunctive relief may have been the only relief available to the plaintiff,
because the record suggested that the defendant was judgment-proof. Id. at 1045 n.2.
'96 Id. at 1045.
' 97 Id.
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tional time and expense involved in bringing two suits rather than one renders
the results different. 198
A third approach to the Bennett situation was advocated in the Bennett dis-
sent. In his dissent, Judge Edwards relied on the determine-enforce ap-
proach' 99 to argue that jurisdiction ought to have been upheld over the claims
for both the monetary and injunctive relief. 200 The dissent noted that federal
courts have historically exercised their equitable powers to enforce alimony
payments due under already determined state divorce decrees."' In applying
this same approach to state child custody awards, Judge Edwards reasoned that
the majority correctly noted that a federal court may not determine the custody of
children. 202 He argued, however, that it does not follow that a federal court is
powerless to enforce an otherwise valid custody decree. 203 Judge Edwards rea-
soned that enforcement of a state decree does not require inquiry in the best in-
terests of the children—a status determination. 2 °4 Rather, "a federal court
need only give effect to the finding decision of a state court. " 2 " Under the dis-
sent's reasoning, jurisdiction should have been extended to both claims for
relief, as both involved only enforcement, and not determination, of domestic
rights."6
The dissent's reliance on the determine-enforce approach is misplaced:
The application of the approach generally had been limited by the federal
courts to cases where retrospective relief in the form of money owed the plain-
' 98 This difference in result is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it runs counter to the
nature of diversity jurisdiction as established by the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under 28 U.S.C. S 1652 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) the federal courts
must apply state law in all diversity actions. In Erie, the Supreme Court disapproved its earlier
interpretation in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) that the term "state law" encom-
passes only state statutes and not general common law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at
79-80. The purpose behind the Erie doctrine, as set out in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1943) is to ensure that in all cases where a federal court exercises diversity
jurisdiction, the outcome of the litigation will be the same as if the case had been tried in a state
court. Id. at 109. The Bennett outcome frustrates this purpose. Second, the necessity of bringing
two suits in the case of a federal court litigant seeking both damages and an injunction runs
counter to the "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" lying
behind the federal court doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, S 19, at 73-77 (discussing pendent
jurisdiction). While the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction — which allows state claims arising out
of the same factual situation as federal claims to be joined with the federal claim under federal
question jurisdiction — does not apply directly to the Bennett situation, the theory behind the doc-
trine -- to avoid unnecessary litigation by hearing all related claims in one lawsuit — is equally
applicable to Bennett situations involving diversity jurisdiction.
' 99 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
200 Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
201 Id. at 1045 n.2 (citing Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1976);
Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571, 573-74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954)).
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tiff has been requested."' The Supreme Court, which first recognized this ap-
proach in Barber, specifically limited the approach to cases where alimony has
accrued, and only to the extent of the amount due.'" Such a limitation of the
approach is .needed because of the difference between prospective and ret-
rospective relief. As the Bennett majority noted, before a court may grant pro-
spective injunctive relief, the equities of the situation must be considered.'"
The need to consider the interests of all the affected parties is therefore inherent
in the granting of injunctive relief. Consequently, no injunction could have
issued in Bennett without the court's having first made a determination of the
interests of both the parties and the children. Such a determination exceeds the
scope of the enforce branch of the determine-enforce approach as it has been
developed by the federal courts. Thus, while the dissent's approach yields a
logical result, it is nevertheless wrong because it does not take into account the
inherent differences between retrospective and prospective relief.
The Bennett decision illustrates the unsatisfactory state of the domestic
relations exception. The nature of the case and property-status approaches of-
fer tests for determining when the exception is applicable and are both es-
tablished in precedent. Yet, in some cases they lead to consistent results and in
others they do not. Additionally, the approaches may lead to unfairness by
depriving litigants of the right to seek relief they would otherwise have been
able to seek in state court. The illogical and unsatisfactory result in Bennett
reflects the inherent drawbacks in the domestic relations exception, and sug-
gests the need to re-evaluate the doctrine. The remainder of this analysis will
offer such a re-evaluation of the exception, focusing on its justifications and
basic premise.
B. A Critique of the Justifications for the
Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations exception has its source in dicta. 21 ° No authority
was cited in either Barber or Burrus for the proposition that federal courts may
not hear family law matters.'" Various justifications for the doctrine, however,
have been offered by the federal courts over the years since Barber and Burrus
were decided.
1. Constitutional Justifications
Some courts have offered constitutional justifications for the exception.
The constitutional justifications may be broken down into two categories: the
207 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Gonzales, 74 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
200
 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590-91 (1858).
2" Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 942 (1979) (interests of third parties must be considered in granting in-
junctive relief).
210
 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.), red. denied, 103 S. Ct. 372
(1982).
21
 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Stipp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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separation of powers justification and the federalism justification. Courts offer-
ing the separation of powers justification have reasoned that domestic con-
troversies fall outside the power granted to federal judiciary by the Constitu-
tion. 212 This argument holds that the power to grant divorces and to decide
other domestic matters existed in England in the ecclesiastical courts,"' Parlia-
ment, 214 or in the sovereign as parens patriae."' Thus, at the time of the crea-
tion of the Constitution, it was understood that such power did not belong to
the secular courts. 216 Consequently, when the federal judiciary was created, its
grant of power did not include the power to hear such matters. 217 Because this
power never passed to the federal judiciary, this argument suggests, any ju-
dicial power over such matters consequently developed lies solely in the state
courts. 218
The separation of powers justification is seriously flawed. It suggests that
the federal judiciary is constitutionally precluded from deciding domestic mat-
ters. Yet, the Supreme Court in both Simms and De La Rama upheld the power
of the federal courts to hear divorce suits in the territories."' Also, in these
same cases, the Court upheld its own power to hear appeals from divorce ac-
tions brought in the federal territorial courts. 22° Similarly, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has exercised jurisdiction over appeals from
divorce actions. 22 ' The fact that federal courts may enforce policy on mat-
rimonial status when laid down by a territorial legislature or Congress in-
dicates that there is no constitutional bar grounded in separation of powers to
212 See, e.g., Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F. 818, 821 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904); U.S. CONST. art.
III, 55 1-2. Relevant portions are set out supra note 2.
219
	 e.g., Ohio ex rd. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930); Barber v. Barber,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 604 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting). 	 •
214 When this country was settled, the power to grant a divorce from the bonds of
matrimony was exercised by the Parliament of England. The ecclesiastical courts
... were limited to the granting of divorce from bed and board. Naturally, the
legislative assemblies of the colonies followed the example of Parliament and treated
the subject as one within their province.
Maynard, 125 U.S. at 206. Some of the colonies maintained the tradition of legislative divorces in
their assemblies. See CLARK, supra note 29, 5 11.1, at 283.
2 " See, e.g., Fontain v. Ravenal, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854) (Taney, C. J., con-
curring); Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F. 818, 820-21 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904). Parens patriae — literally
"parent of the country" — was the Crown's prerogative to protect its subjects who were unable
to protect themselves. CLARK, supra note 29, 5 17.1, at 572. For a general discussion of the
parens patriae power see Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?,
25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895 (1976).
216 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
217 Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F. 818, 821 (C.C.D. Ind. 1904) (quoting Fontain v. Ravenal,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854)); CLARK, supra note 29, 11.1, at 286.
"a Hoadly v. Chase, 126 F, at 821.
219 De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1906); Simms v. Simms, 175
U.S. 162, 167-68 (1899).




221 See, e.g., Bottomley v. Bottomley, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 262 F.2d 23 (1958);
Moncure v. Moncure, 51 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 278 F. 1005 (1922).
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the involvement of the federal courts in domestic controversies. 222 It follows
that there is no constitutional bar to the courts' applying state law in diversity
cases . 223
The federalism branch of the constitutional justifications does not focus
solely on the power of the federal judiciary to hear domestic cases. Instead, the
focus is on the allocation of power between state and federal governments.
Courts proferring this justification have argued that the power to regulate
domestic matters lies in the state governments, and their concomitant
branches, and not in the federal government.224 This argument is based on the
premise that the federal government is one of enumerated and limited
powers. 225 Courts have noted that the power to regulate domestic matters is not
specifically granted to the federal government by the Constitution. 275 Thus,
these courts argue, the power to regulate domestic matters is reserved to the
states, and the federal courts, as part of the federal government, can have no
jurisdiction over domestic controversies. 227
The federalism justification fares no better than the separation of powers
justification as convincing support for the domestic relations exception. It is
true that the federal government has no power to directly regulate domestic
matters. Thus, for example, Congress could not pass a law regulating mar-
riage, divorce, alimony or support. 228
 That power lies in the states, because
such power is not specifically delegated to the federal government in the Con-
stitution. 229 While the power to regulate domestic matters as a general rule lies
with the states, such a disclaimer refers only to the legislative power of the
federal government to lay down substantive rules of law in domestic relations
areas and not to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 23° The fact
222 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
"3 Id.
224 See, e.g., Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Williamson v.
Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Wilson, 314 F. Supp. at 272.
224
 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112 (1978).
226 Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1390-91 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Williamson v.
Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969). Wilson, 314 F. Supp. at 272.
" 7
 Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. at 1390; Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. at
518.
228
 This is so because the federal government is one of limited powers. NOWAK, supra
note 225, at 112. No action may be taken by Congress unless it is within one of its enumerated
powers. Id. Because the power to regulate domestic matters is not specifically delegated to Con-
gress in the Constitution, it presumably has no power to legislate such matters.
229
 The Constitution reserves power not delegated to the federal government to the
states and the people. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Consequently, state governments are not
creatures of limited powers, but rather possess inherent general powers. NOWAK, supra note 225,
at 112. Among the states' inherent power is the police power to protect and regulate its citizens.
Id. The power to regulate domestic matters is included in the police power. See Developments in the
Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198 (1980) [hereinafter referred to
as Developments].
238 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Moreover, it is not en-
tirely clear that the authority to legislate family matters is beyond the powers granted to Con-
gress. The fourteenth amendment grants to Congress the power to enforce by legislation the pro-
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that federal courts are, in diversity cases, compelled to apply state law, 23 '
whether based in statute or common law, suggests that federal courts may hear
domestic matters. To argue otherwise would render unconstitutional the whole
area of diversity jurisdiction, because federal courts exercising their diversity
jurisdiction are asked to decide matters over which the federal government has
no power to make law.
2. Statutory Justifications
In addition to the constitutional justifications, statutory justifications for
the domestic relations exception have been offered by the courts. The earliest of
the statutory justifications focused on the language of the Congressional grant
of power to the inferior federal courts, as it existed at the time of Barber. The
Judiciary Code of 1789 granted to the federal courts the power to hear "suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity. "232 It has been suggested that the
power to grant divorces or alimony did not fall within either common law or
equity jurisdiction, thereby precluding the exercise of such power by the federal
courts. 233
The validity of this justification was questionable, even at the time Barber
was decided. One court has noted that the temporal courts in England did have
power over domestic matters to some degree. 234
 Consequently, this same
power passed to the federal courts under its common law and equity jurisdic-
tion. 233
 In addition to the historical inaccuracy of the statutory justification,
this justification no longer has any force as the equity and law diversity ju-
risdiction of the federal courts were merged into jurisdiction over "civil ac-
tions" in 1948. 236
A second statutory justification offered by the courts focuser on the prob-
lem of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Historically, husbands and wives
could not be citizens of different states so long as the marriage relation con-
tinued. 237 Thus, there could be no diversity jurisdiction between spouses. This
visions of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 5 5. The recent recognition of
family related rights under the aegis of due process and equal protection suggest that such
legislative authority may not be beyond the power of Congress. See infra notes 260-93 and accom-
panying text.
23'
	 U.S.C. S 1652 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 64 (1938).
232
 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, S 11, 1 Stat. 78. Relevant portions of the statute are set out
supra at note 2.
233
	 v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 605 (1858); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F.
Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25, at 97.
234 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 806-09.
235 Id. at 806.
23° C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, 5 25, at 97. Thus, whether or not divorce and other
domestic matters were encompassed in law or in equity jurisdiction is no longer an important
consideration. The change in the statutory language renders invalid this statutory justification for
the exception. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, 5 3609, at 663.
2" De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906).
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historical doctrine no longer exists. It is now recognized that a person may sue
his or her spouse in federal court under diversity jurisdiction so long as he
establishes citizenship different from that of the spouse.'"
The only currently valid statutory justification for the domestic relations
exception involves the amount in controversy requirement. Federal courts
have suggested that most domestic matters in themselves involve no pecuniary
value, thus implying that the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy cannot
be satisfied in domestic controversies.'" This argument applies in cases such as
child custody actions, where no monetary amount has been alleged; valuing in
monetary terms the custody of a child, arguably, is impossible."° Yet, by its
own terms this argument would not apply in domestic cases where an amount
in controversy greater than $10,000 is alleged. Further, such an argument is
only a limitation on which domestic controversies may be heard—equally ap-
plicable to all cases brought in diversity jurisdiction—and is not, therefore, a
justification for the domestic relations exception in general.
3. Policy Justifications
More compelling than the constitutional or statutory justifications are the
policy considerations supporting the domestic relations exception. Several
courts have argued that the domestic relations exception exists because state
courts are more competent to decide such matters."' This argument empha-
sizes that state courts have had years of experience in determining domestic law
matters,'" and are more familiar with the criteria to be considered in deter-
mining them.'" Accordingly, the argument concludes, domestic relations mat-
ters are more peculiarly suited to state regulation and control, and ought not be
heard in federal courts.'" A second argument supporting the domestic rela-
tions exception is that the exception is necessary to maintain a unitary system
of regulation over domestic matters.'" Such a unitary system is needed,
according to this argument, because of a strong state interest in maintaining
control over family law matters.'"
The state competence justification is the less convincing of these policy
arguments. While state courts do have more experience in dealing with do-
mestic relations matters, this is probably more a statement about the result of
years of application of the domestic relations exception than a justification for
239 Id. ; Chord, 131 F. at 102.
239 See, e.g., Clifford, 131 F. at 102.
249 Id.
• 2" See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp.
482, 484 (E.D. La. 1967); Brandtscheit, 239 F. Supp. at 654.
242 C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, S 25, at 97.
243 Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968).
2" Id.
245
	 The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLum. L. REV. 489, 509
(1954).
246 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, 5 3609, at 663.
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its existence. Having had exclusive jurisdiction over matters of divorce and
related matters for over a century might well enable the state courts to deal
more competently with domestic relations matters than can federal courts. This
does not, however, justify the refusal to take jurisdiction otherwise granted to
the federal courts. Moreover, at least one court has noted that this competence
is true of all diversity cases, and not just domestic relations matters. 247 This
disparity in competence does not justify the refusal to take jurisdiction in
domestic matters any more than it would in tort or contract actions.
As to the argument that the exception is necesssary to maintain a unitary
system of control over domestic matters because of a strong state interest in
such matters, it is likely that federal judges will not apply state domestic law
any more divergently than will different state judges. 248 Thus, the system
would be no less uniform if domestic matters were heard under diversity
jurisdiction.'" In addition, the presence of a strong state interest in family law
matters appears to have declined. The development of no-fault divorce in a
majority of states25° and the general relaxation of restrictions on who may
marry25 ' suggest that the state interest in regulating marriage and divorce is no
longer as strong as it once was, thereby weakening that justification for the
domestic relations exception.
An alternative policy consideration offered by the courts is based on more
practical reasons for maintaining the domestic relations exception. Several
courts have suggested that the doctrice is justified by the fact that federal dock-
ets are overcrowded, and allowing domestic relations matters into the federal
forum would only aggravate the problem. 252 Removing an entire area of law
from the consideration of federal courts is clearly an effective way to avoid
adding to the caseload of an already overburdened federal court system. Lower
federal courts have recognized a doctrine of abstention solely for the purpose of
serving the convenience of the federal courts. 253
247 Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1978).
248 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 812 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
242 Id.
250 In nearly all American jurisdictions, marriage breakdown and incompatibility are
grounds for divorce. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 12 (3d ed.
1980). Thus, fault has largely been eliminated from the question of whether a divorce will be
granted. Id.
" 1 In recent years, marriage laws have loosened, thus reducing to "levels of gesture"
the requirements for marriage. KRAUSE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 804 (1976).
Entry into marriage is now, as a result, virtually unlimited. Id.
252 See, e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977). The overcrowded
federal court dockets have been noted by the federal courts in contexts other than the domestic
relations exception. See Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 334 (1979) (class action suit by retail
consumers); Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit
against insurance company regarding disability insurance contract); Kroger v. Owen Equip. &
Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 424-25 n.25 (8th Cir. 1977) (ancillary jurisdiction).
253 C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 52, at 227-28. See, e.g., Klein v. Walston & Co., Inc.,
432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970) (suit for damages incurred in fraudulent securities transaction);
Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970) (suit for damages from viola-
tion of Securities Exchange Act).
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The validity of the overcrowded dockets justification for the exception is
currently in question. As recently as 1976, the Supreme Court emphasized the
impropriety of a federal courts' refusing to hear cases that could otherwise be
brought in state courts solely because the federal courts are "too busy" to try
them in the context of a dismissal of an action to a state court.'" While there is
a difference between a dismissal and a refusal to take initial jurisdiction, 2" the
Court's language casts doubt on the acceptability of the overcrowded dockets
justification. Moreover, careful consideration of this justification for the
domestic relations exception reveals that it is not as convincing a justification as
it may appear to be. Perhaps if all domestic matters were brought under diver-
sity jurisdiction, a significant impact would be made on the federal court
dockets. The very nature of domestic controversies, however, limits which con-
troversies may be brought in federal courts under their diversity jurisdiction.
First, the nature of the parties involved in domestic controversies indicates that
a number of domestic controversies are kept out of the federal courts because of
a lack of diverse citizenship. This is so because in many cases, family members
reside in the same state. In addition, the amount in controversy requirement
severely limits which cases can be brought in federal court. Many matters per-
taining to domestic affairs are not conducive to pecuniary valuation. Thus,
divorce actions in which neither property nor support is in dispute, and actions
in which only child custody is in dispute, among others, are eliminated from
federal diversity jurisdiction because of the inability to meet the requirement of
$10,000 in controversy, regardless of the existence of the domestic relations ex-
ception. Because the percentage of divorce cases in which support is actually
disputed is relatively small, 256
 and because federal courts currently enforce ac-
crued alimony payments 257
 it appears that the domestic relations exception
itself does not exclude from diversity jurisdiction as large a number of cases as
the overcrowded dockets argument suggests. Eliminating the exception would
not, therefore, result in the further overcrowding of the federal courts which
this justification portends."B
23* Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (removal ac-
tion).
155
 C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, S 52, at 227.
256
 While specific data do not exist on the subject, estimates indicate that alimony is not
involved in about 90% or more of all divorces. KRAUSE, supra note 251, at 935. Available
estimates suggest further that less than 10% of all divorces are contested in court. Mnookin &
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 951 n.3
(1979). In most cases of divorce, matters such as property, custody, and the like are worked out
ahead of time by the parties, and the court merely rubber stamps the parties' agieement. Fried-
man & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC'Y
• REV. 267, 270 (1976) quoted in id. at 951 & n.2. These figures indicate that while the divorce rate
in the United States is high, with estimates in 1980 reaching 1.82 million, U.S. Department of
Commerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (1981), all but about 10% of
this number do not involve property disputes. The requirements that the disputed property ex-
ceed $10,000 in value and that the disputing parties be of diverse citizenship further limits the
number of divorces which could be brought in federal court.
252 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
258
 Domestic matters are not, of course, limited to divorces and alimony enforcement.
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In summary, the domestic relations exception cannot be supported by any
constitutional or statutory justifications. Rather, the federal courts have the
power to act, but for policy reasons based on perceived state competence, need
for a uniform system of regulation and overcrowded federal dockets, choose not
to exercise it. Close analysis of the policy reasons, however, indicates that they
are not convincing support for the exception. Federal courts could easily apply
state domestic law as competently and uniformly as state judges, without
significantly overburdening the federal court system. Yet, both the courts and
Congress 2 S 9
 continue to be unwilling to involve the federal courts in domestic
matters. Despite this reluctance on the part of the federal judiciary and
legislature, a compelling reason exists which calls out for the abolition of the
domestic relations exception. The final section of this discussion will suggest
that such a reason may be found in the fact that the exception is inconsistent
with the recognition of federal constitutional rights pervading the field of family
law, and therefore ought to be abolished.
C. The Domestic Relations Exception and the Recognition of
Constitutional Family-based Rights
The domestic relations exception should be abolished because the princi-
ple underlying the exception is no longer valid. This basic principle of the ex-
ception is that the area of domestic matters is not a federal concern, but is total-
ly within the realm of state law. 26° While it may have been true in the nine-
These matters, however, account for many of the possible cases involving disputes in excess of
$10,000. Actions for breach of separation agreements, antenuptial agreements and postnuptial
agreements could involve $10,000, as could tort actions and child snatchings involving sufficient
damages. As to the effect on federal court dockets of extending diversity jurisdiction to such mat-
ters, some federal courts already enforce agreements between marital parties, treating them as
any other contract action. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 242 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Tort ac-
tions between marital parties as well are currently heard in federal court. See, e.g. , Cole v. Cole,
633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).. As to the number of child snatching cases per year, unofficial
estimates place the number at about 100,000. Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15 FAM. L.
Q. 103, 103 n.2 (1981). The number of such cases which could be brought in federal court would
be limited by the fact that in some cases, the abducting parent cannot be located, and by the fact
that state remedies, including habeas actions to recover custody of the child, are available to
redress child snatchings. See generally id., passim.
259
 In 1981, Congress considered a bill which would have extended diversity jurisdiction
to enforce child custody orders, without regard to an amount in controversy. H.R. 223, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The subcommittee considering the bill did not act on the bill because of
the presence of "too many issues," including those advanced in a letter from the Department of
Justice advising against passage of the bill. Telephone conversation with Bill Shattuck, Majority
Counsel to the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law (Nov, 8, 1982). The Department of
Justice letter stated as follows: "In short, constitutional considerations aside, we believe that
H.R. 223 would result in an unwarranted expansion of the jurisdiction of the already crowded
federal courts to embrace matters that traditionally have been regulated by state laws which can
and should be applied by state courts." Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legislative Affairs of the Department of Justice, to Peter W. Rodino, Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee (Nov. 17, 1981).
560
 The initial promulgation of the disclaimer of federal jurisdiction in Barber was limited
to divorce and alimony. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858). Barnes broadened the disclaimer to
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teenth century that domestic matters were solely a state concern, a fairly recent
trend in Supreme Court decisions has recognized fundamental rights relative
to the family which are protected by the Constitution. This recognition of con-
stitutional rights in matters of family life seriously undermines the basis of the
domestic relations exception and signals the need to abolish the doctrine.
The beginning of the trend in the constitutionalization of family-based
rights can be traced to two cases decided in the 1920's. 261 During this period,
the Supreme Court had exhibited a willingness to give substantive content to
the notion of due process by recognizing specific rights of the individual, in-
cluding economic rights, encompassed within the concept of liberty. 262 The two
Supreme Court cases, Meyer v. Nebraska 263 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 261
recognized fundamental constitutional rights embodied in the family. In Meyer,
an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public schools was found to
be an unconstitutional infringement of liberty under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 265 In Pierce, the Court struck down a Nebraska
statute which made it illegal for a teacher to teach any language other than
English in the schools. 266
 In these cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
term "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment 267 encompasses rights other than
merely freedom from bodily restraint. 268 Among these rights, according to the
Court, are the rights to marry and raise a family.'" The Supreme Court
established in these cases that while a state may regulate its citizens in matters
affecting the family unit, 270
 it may not do so in a manner which disrupts the
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter" without compelling
justification . 2 "
The willingness of the Supreme Court to recognize substantive due proc-
ess rights ceased in the 1930's. 272 The fundamental rights recognized under the
the general contours of domestic law. 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). Consequently, the notion
that the whole subject of domestic relations belongs to state and not federal law has become the
grounds for declining jurisdiction in cases involving many aspects of domestic relations law. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
2" Developments, supra note 229, at 1162.
262 Id. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, on due process
grounds, a state law setting maximum daily and weekly hours for bakery workers). This era of
invalidating statutes on substantive due process grounds has been deemed the "Lochner era" by
commentators. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-2, at 434 (1978 ) .
263 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
264 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
265
 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
266
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925).
267 [ NI or shall any state deprive any person of ... liberty ... without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
266 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925).
269
 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535. In
each case, the Court rested its decision on the fact that the statutes interfered with the "liberty"
of parents to educate their children as they choose.
"° Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
271 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
272
 L. TRIBE, supra note 262, § 8-5, at 442.
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aegis of liberty in Meyer and Pierce, however, survived this change in Supreme
Court philosophy."' Almost twenty years after its decision in Meyer, the Su-
preme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization
of criminals committing certain crimes of moral turpitude, but not other crimes
of a similar nature. 274 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 275 the Court held that such a
statute violated the equal protection clause.'" In doing so, the Court continued
to recognize the existence of constitutionally protected rights arising from the
family relationship. The Skinner Court noted that both marriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental rights and, because of the importance of the rights of the
persons affected in the statute, reviewed the statute with strict scrutiny. 277
Finding that the law unfairly classified which criminals would be sterilized, the
Skinner Court declared the statute unconstitutional."'
The Supreme Court continued to recognize fundamental rights arising out
of family related matters with its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. 279 In
Griswold, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute forbidding the
dispensing of contraceptive material to married couples.'" In reviewing the
statute, the Court reasoned that the guarantees of individual freedoms spe-
cifically enumerated in the Constitution have "penumbras" which form a con-
stitutionally protected right to privacy."' According to the court, this right to
privacy encompasses activity carried on in the marital relationship, 282 as well as
the rights of persons to make choices regarding the upbringing of children as
enumerated in Meyer and Pierce."' Finding that the state contraception statute
invaded the right of privacy without due process, the Court declared the statute
unconstitutional.'" The decision in Griswold suggests that while the source of
fundamental rights to decide matters of family life had changed from the con-
cept of liberty to the concept of the individual's right of privacy, the Court's
willingness to recognize and protect these personal rights had, nevertheless, re-
mained unaltered.
Later Supreme Court decisions have developed further the fundamental
right to privacy and autonony in matters of family life, as established in the
Meyer-Skinner-Griswold line of cases. Thus, the right of an individual to
marry, 285 to decide when and if one will procreate, 286 and to divorce"' have
275 Developments, supra note 229, at 1162-63.
274 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
"5 Id.
276 Id. at 541.
277 Id.
278 M
279 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
288 Id. at 485.
28' It at 484-85.
282 Id. at 485.
288 Id. at 482-83.
284 Id. at 485.
285 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
286 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
287 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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been recognized as rights subsumed within the right to privacy, which may not
be infringed without compelling justification. Likewise, other areas of domestic
law have assumed constitutional magnitude. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized constitutional implications in the granting of alimony,'" the terminating
of parental rights, 289 defining the family unit,'" and the granting or denying of
custody, 29 ' under both the equal protection and due process clauses. This line
of cases suggests that the state is no longer free to regulate domestic matters in
an unfettered manner, because domestic relations law is not solely a state con-
cern. Rather, there is a collection of fundamental rights in matters of family
life, the recognition of which postdates the birth of the domestic relations ex-
ception, which are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution and which per-
vade the field of family law, thereby limiting the state's power over such mat-
ters. 292 While this line of constitutional cases does not suggest that there is a
constitutional right to litigate domestic controversies under diversity jurisdic-
tion, it does indicate the notion that family law is solely a state concern—the
cornerstone of the domestic exception—is no longer true. Rather, family law is
now a field occupied by both state and federal law. The domestic exception,
which is based on this fallacious notion, is therefore inconsistent with the trend
recognizing constitutional rights in matters of family law. 293
299 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
259 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
290 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
291 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
292 The states do have the power to regulate the family. This power derives from two
sources: the police power and the parens patriae power. Developments, supra note 229, at 1198. See
supra notes 215 & 229. There appears to be some controversy, however, regarding the nature of
the constitutional rights recognized in the Mryer-Griswold-Skinner line of cases. One school of
thought suggests that it is the family which has been granted constitutional protection pursuant to
these cases. See Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C. L. REV. 935 (1981).
Another school of thought suggests that while the Supreme Court's earlier cases suggest this in-
terpretation, later cases have de-emphasized the constitutional protection of the family unit. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 262, S 15-21, at 987 citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53
(1976) (rejecting absolute parental veto over minor's abortion); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976) (no privacy right violated by statute outlawing segregated private academies); Baker
v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1976) aff'g 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (parental approval of
corporal punishment in school not constitutionally required). This view suggests that Meyer and
its progeny have created individual powers in matters of family life which restrict the power of the
state to regulate the family. L. TRIBE, supra note 262, 5 15-21, at 987. The particular approach
adopted does not affect this analysis of the domestic relations exception. In both schools of
thought, family-based rights — whether belonging to the family unit or the individual — are
recognized. Both approaches thus acknowledge the presence of federal law in matters of family
law.
293 The Supreme Court has recently affirmed its willingness to continue the trend
establishing constitutional aspects of family law. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
one of the Court's most recent decisions in the area of family law, the Supreme Court reviewed a
New York statute which permitted the termination of parental rights upon a showing, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, that the parents had failed to care for their child. Id. at 747.
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed the Court's historical recognition that
freedom of choice in matters of family life is a fundamental interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 753. The Court weighed the fundamental nature of the parents' rights against
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In summary, the inconsistency of the domestic relations exception with
the more recent constitutionalization of family related rights mandates the
abolition of the exception. By maintaining the exception, the federal courts
adopt a schizophrenic approach to domestic affairs. On the one hand, they
recognize that federal law does, in fact, play a large role in family law matters
through the protection of constitutional rights in fundamental matters of family
life. On the other hand, they hold fast to a doctrine whose basic premise is that
the sole source of law regarding the family is state law, thus abstaining from
hearing family law matters in diversity cases despite their constitutional and
statutory power to do so. Because the trend in the federalization of family law is
of constitutional magnitude, as opposed to the policy-based concerns relative to
the domestic relations exception, the exception should not stand to frustrate the
spirit of this trend.
D. Effects of Abolishing the Domestic Relations Exception
Abolition of the domestic relations exception would effect the law of
federal courts in two ways. The most important effect of abandoning the doc-
trine would be the establishment of a uniform approach to matters of family
law on the part of federal courts. By extending diversity jurisdiction to do-
mestic controvesies, federal courts would give credence to the fact that federal
law does play a part in domestic affairs, contrary to the law existing when the
Supreme Court decided Barber and Burrus.
Second, the practical effects of abolishing the domestic relations exception
would not be as great as proponents of the exception might suggest. Some
domestic controversies would be excluded from diversity jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, those matters involving family members residing in the same state
would be excluded as would cases not meeting the $10,000 amount in con-
the risk of error under the evidentiary standard and the state's interest in maintaining the stand-
ard, and concluded that due process demanded more than a showing of a preponderance of the
evidence before parental rights may be terminated. Id, at 768. Four Justices dissented. Writing
for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority's decision invited further federal court
intrusion into state family law. Id. at 770. Fearing that such a trend in federal intervention would
stifle the states' abilities to creatively deal with family law matters, the dissent argued that the
statute should have been upheld. Id. at 791. Santosky lends further support to the argument to
abolish the domestic relations exception. By establishing yet another area of federal intervention
in the area of family law, Santosky is more proof that the exception is no longer based on a valid
premise. Moreover, the very reasons why the dissent rejected federal court intervention in San-
tosky do not argue against abolition of the exception. Allowing federal courts to hear domestic
matters would not, as Justice Rehnquist feared, stifle the creativity of state legislatures to deal
with domestic matters. Because federal courts must apply state law in diversity cases, federal
judges would merely apply the solutions developed in the state legislature and courts, as would
any state judge. Such action would not result in any encroachment upon the states' power over
family law matters.
In addition, federal involvement in family law has occurred through statutory as well as
constitutional avenues. Thus, for example, the AFDC program and special provisions in the tax
law have had an influence on the family. See generally KRAUSE, supra note 251, at 230-46; Bittker,
Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1978).
696	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol, 24:661
troversy requirement. This necessity of meeting both requirements of diversity
and sufficient amount in controversy simultaneously would serve to limit
severely which domestic controversies would be brought under federal court
jurisdiction were the domestic relations exception abolished.
While the requirements of diversity jurisdiction would act as a limit on the
number and type of domestic disputes heard in federal court, it is not disputed
that abolition of the exception would broaden the range of cases now heard in
federal court. The requirements in turn make it impossible to estimate the ex-
act effect of abolishing the doctrine. 294 Whether great or small, however, the ef-
fect would be a necessary and inevitable one to maintain a logical and uniform
approach by the federal courts to domestic relations matters.
CONCLUSION
The domestic relations exception has enjoyed a long tenure in the law of
federal courts. Despite its dubious origins in dicta, the doctrine has developed
into a well-established rule to which the federal courts adhere with remarkable
tenacity. The effect of the exception is to preclude from constitutionally and
statutorily granted diversity jurisdiction a host of litigants involved in domestic
controversies. Concerns of consistency and fairness, however, must override
any practical reasons for maintaining the domestic relations exception. The
premise of the doctrine has been undermined by the recognition of constitu-
tional rights relative to the family. Consequently, maintenance of the exception
results in the federal courts approaching matters of family law in an inconsist-
ent manner. Given the importance of family based rights to society and its
members, a harmonious approach on the part of the federal courts is needed.
The domestic relations exception, therefore, ought to be abolished, and diversi-
ty jurisdiction extended to domestic controversies.
LINDA A. OUELLETTE
"4
 For a discussion of the possible impact on the federal courts of the abolition of the
doctrine, see supra notes 256 & 258.
